Are your cellphone calls secure from eavesdropping?

Kjetil R. Hetland wrote:
> "Jon" <spam@unlockingshop.co.uk> wrote in message
> news:MPG.1a820a97e406d99a9897b9@news.cis.dfn.de...
>
>>Spyforce posted the following for all to hear...
>>
>>>Looking to ensure that your cellphone calls are secure from
>>>eavesdropping?
>>
>>No, they already are.
>
>
> could you please explain that a bit more ?? (reference.. ?)
>

Those of us who use CDMA don't have to worry about eavesdropping over
the air. Of course, the powers-that-be can still listen to calls by
placing a tap at the phone company.

Jesse

In article <1j2j101lrvd33rmgjedki4d60ptr49h2dj@4ax.com>,
<hairydog@despammed.com> wrote:
>On Thu, 29 Jan 2004 23:28:36 +0100, "Kjetil R. Hetland"
><kjetil@stillhetens.net> wrote:
>
>>could you please explain that a bit more
>
>You could start at http://www.mobileshop.org/howitworks/encryption.htm
>for a fairly non-technical overview.

While the crossposting list is pretty much exclusively GSM, and security
on GSM is discussed in the above Web site, I just wanted to describe how
CDMA does it. The CDMA protocol uses the mobile's ESN (= GSM IMEI) in its
spreading algorithm for the traffic from the mobile to the cell site. The
result is that this traffic is pretty much indistinguishable from white
noise if you don't know the ESN; you not only cannot decode it, you can't
even find it. The mobile knows its own ESN, and the system looks it up
in its database from the MIN (Mobile Identification Number = GSM IMSI).
The ESN is never transmitted. With CDMA, the encryption is part
of the protocol, not a separate step. I believe the CDMA "encryption"
is secure against anything short of government cryptography agencies.

CharlesH wrote:

> While the crossposting list is pretty much exclusively GSM, and security
> on GSM is discussed in the above Web site, I just wanted to describe how
> CDMA does it. The CDMA protocol uses the mobile's ESN (= GSM IMEI) in its
> spreading algorithm for the traffic from the mobile to the cell site. The
> result is that this traffic is pretty much indistinguishable from white
> noise if you don't know the ESN; you not only cannot decode it, you can't
> even find it. The mobile knows its own ESN, and the system looks it up
> in its database from the MIN (Mobile Identification Number = GSM IMSI).
> The ESN is never transmitted. With CDMA, the encryption is part
> of the protocol, not a separate step. I believe the CDMA "encryption"
> is secure against anything short of government cryptography agencies.

When the government has a Title III warrant, they have access to the
same ESN database as the carrier - then they can do whatever the hell
they want to do, air side or wire side. The only reason their
cryptographers need get involved is when they don't have a warrant.
Considering the way the Patriot Act is written and/or interpreted, I
imagine the crypto department is as busy as the war chalkers, and having
twice the fun.


--
jer email reply - I am not a 'ten' ICQ = 35253273
"All that we do is touched with ocean, yet we remain on the shore of
what we know." -- Richard Wilbur

In message <<bvcbsv0ft0@enews1.newsguy.com>> hoch@exemplary.invalid
(CharlesH) did ramble:

>The ESN is never transmitted. With CDMA, the encryption is part
>of the protocol, not a separate step. I believe the CDMA "encryption"
>is secure against anything short of government cryptography agencies.

Generally probably true. However, the government wouldn't bother, they
can tap it from the cellular network directly (rather then over the air)

DevilsPGD <lookatmeNOSPAM@crazyhat.net> wrote in message news:<etsj10pslsavd04d5had8nuhclsi4dr1u4@4ax.com>. ..
> In message <<bvcbsv0ft0@enews1.newsguy.com>> hoch@exemplary.invalid
> (CharlesH) did ramble:
>
> >The ESN is never transmitted. With CDMA, the encryption is part
> >of the protocol, not a separate step. I believe the CDMA "encryption"
> >is secure against anything short of government cryptography agencies.
>
> Generally probably true. However, the government wouldn't bother, they
> can tap it from the cellular network directly (rather then over the air)

The latest wire tap investigation rules include "roving wiretaps".
Used in cases, where the person of interest, changes phones...
payphones and/or multiple wireless phones, like prepaids, whose
ownership cannot be traced.

I'm guessing... the one common thread in such a case would be tracking
through a voice print or directly intercepting target communications,
in the field, through electronic amplification of calls and in the
case of wireless, whatever data keys too.
It's obvious, if the cdma call data can be recorded, it would be easy
to decode for content, later.

Perhaps part of the survelliance process, includes quickly identifying
which line at the CO to record? Or instantly cloning the target phone
to hear both sides of the conversation?

Just curious if a roving wiretap can continue automatically, without
agents tailing the individual?

The method is likely a big secret, but the authorities can do
it...somehow? Any ideas?

-
David

"Jon" <spam@unlockingshop.co.uk> wrote in message
news:MPG.1a820a97e406d99a9897b9@news.cis.dfn.de...
| Spyforce posted the following for all to hear...
| > Looking to ensure that your cellphone calls are secure from
| > eavesdropping?
|

No, they already are; especially when you keep walking around (never sit
still in a phonecall)